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Recent years have seen wide-ranging debates on the nature of tort law. For some, tort law is 
firmly placed within private law: it is concerned with the rights individuals have against each 
other and with the legal implications of the violation of those rights. Others emphasise 
the extent to which broad social considerations enter into the determination of tort liability 
and the many ways in which tort law today serves a public role that is illexplained by the 
private law model. Given the centrality of negligence in contemporary tort law, much of 
this debate focused on this tort, but recent litigation that culminated in the House of Lords’ 
decision in Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police1 and some academic commentary 
relating to it provide an opportunity for examining these questions in the context of the 
intentional torts. 
Though it will be some time before I get to discuss Ashley, it will be useful to describe its 
facts right away. The police had gathered information that James Ashley was involved in 
illegal activities including drug dealing. They obtained a warrant to search his house and 
decided to raid it in the middle of the night. When a police unit entered the house, Ashley 
got up from his bed and walked towards the police officers with his hands pointing towards 
them as though holding a gun. One of the police officers, PC Sherwood, fired a single shot 
 that hit Ashley in the neck. Ashley was severely wounded, and despite the police 
officers’ attempts at resuscitation and the prompt arrival of an ambulance, in less than an 
hour Ashley was pronounced dead. Ashley’s dependants sued the police for negligence 
and trespass to the person with regard to the actions that led to his death, as well as for 
misfeasance in public office with regard to certain events that took place after the shooting. 
As the police admitted negligence they argued that there would be no point in a trial on the 
trespass claim. The trial court accepted the argument, but the Court of Appeal (Auld LJ 
dissenting) reversed and the House of Lords, against the dissenting opinions of Lords 
Carswell and Neuberger, upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision. 
This outcome, coupled with the fact that some of the judges invoked the notion of 
‘vindication of rights’, a shibboleth for proponents of the private conception of tort law, 
has led most commentary on the case to consider it an affirmation of this view of tort 
law.2 One purpose of this essay is to show that this is, at best, an incomplete account of the 
judges’ views expressed in the case. My real concern, however, is broader. With the aid of this 
case I seek to challenge the private law conception of tort liability exactly in the context of 
those torts usually thought to be the best affirmation of this conception of tort law.3 
My discussion therefore begins far from the intentional torts. I consider some of the 
important developments that have changed the face of negligence liability in the last few 
decades and argue that, though very different, they all have in common the introduction 
into the decision on tort liability of considerations that look beyond the litigants. The 
next question is whether a similar trend can be identified with regard to the intentional 
torts. I argue that we can identify a role for the intentional torts within a tort regime 
dominated by the tort of negligence, a role that has much more to do with broad societal (or 
public) considerations than with those confined to the individual parties involved. More 
 concretely, in sections II and III I distinguish between three possible interpretations of 
vindication of rights, two consistent with the private law view of tort law and the third one 
that is not. I argue that the two private law interpretations of vindication are 
unsuccessful, but that the third one provides a limited but potentially useful role for the 
intentional torts. As it happens, it is this, more public conception of vindication that was 
explicitly adopted by some of the judges in Ashley, and which, I contend, provides the 
best justification for the decision. 
 
I. HOW TORT LAW BECAME PUBLIC 
 
Given the age and centrality of tort law, one would be forgiven for thinking that its basic 
principles should be settled by now; but as many have noticed and some have lamented it 
is constantly changing. At first blush it seems that changes have mostly been in the 
direction of limiting liability, with the House of Lords using everything at its disposal to 
achieve this goal: distinguishing new cases from earlier ones on flimsy grounds,4 making 
unsubstantiated claims about the effects of expanding liability,5 limiting past decisions by 
declaring them ‘acceptable on [their] own facts’,6 narrowly interpreting the elements of 
existing torts,7 and rewriting past decisions so as to effectively overrule them without 
saying so.8 When all else has failed, the judges have not shied away from explicitly 
overruling an earlier decision in order to limit the scope of tort liability.9 
These changes, significant though they are, appear from a broader perspective to be a 
rearguard battle against an ever-expanding tort law. There are various reasons for this, of 
which only a small number can be addressed here. One reason for the changes has to do 
 with the substantial increase in the prevalence of accidents after the industrial 
revolution. That tort law now primarily deals with accidents not only explains why 
negligence is much more important than it used to be; it also changed the foundations of 
tort law. Two main features are worth highlighting: first, with industrialisation it became 
commonplace that momentary inadvertence could lead to serious accidents, which made it 
difficult to associate tort liability with moral fault; relatedly, industrialisation also 
weakened the connection between the degree of fault and the amount of harm caused 
(and hence damages award). Although the language of ‘fault’ has been retained, these 
developments meant that tort liability (especially in negligence) no longer corresponded 
well to perceptions of moral fault. Ideas such as loss spreading and general deterrence 
began to appear in both academic work and judicial opinions in its place, and these have 
led to the introduction of broader social considerations into the decision whether tort 
liability should be imposed or not. From this it was but a small step to the view that tort 
law could serve as a regulatory device and to the extent necessary should be refashioned 
accordingly. 
The untying of fault from liability and the emergence of new bases for the imposition of 
tort liability also affected the legitimacy of insurance in the context of tort liability. In the 
nineteenth century, liability (third party) insurance was still considered morally and legally 
suspect due to its potential to relieve defendants of their legal liabilities, and by 
 
implication their moral responsibilities.10 Once the connection between liability and fault 
was severed, it became easier to accept insurance against liability. (Today, let us not forget, 
liability insurance is often required by law.) And once liability insurance was widely 
available, judges openly stated that this was a relevant factor in deciding whether tort 
 liability should be imposed. 
Other factors affected tort liability in a more indirect way. Since the eighteenth 
century, new mathematical tools and new technologies have been developed to gather 
and analyse vast amounts of information. This intellectual development, which Ian 
Hacking called the ‘emergence of probability’,11 has transformed the way people perceive 
the world. If beforehand events were considered in isolation, the result of a single causal 
path, the advent of statistics and probability meant that particular events were increasingly 
considered in terms of their place within wider trends. The effect of this has been to turn 
individual instances of death, disease, crime or accident into social problems, requiring 
some kind of comprehensive response, which many felt only the government could 
provide. The availability of statistics affected tort law in another indirect way: it meant that 
even without physical harm, statistical data could affect the value of property, a person’s 
prospects of employability and so on. These new kinds of loss encouraged the 
development of new doctrines or the updating of old ones. 
Alongside these scientific developments there were also political changes that affected 
tort law. Of the greatest importance is the advent of the modern welfare state and its 
enormous growth. The welfare state took it upon itself to inspect and regulate many 
aspects of people’s lives, especially in the areas of physical and economic health and 
security. In New Zealand such ideas have resulted in the adoption of a social insurance 
scheme against accidents. In other countries their greatest impact has been to expand the 
tort liability of public authorities. In other contexts the expansion of welfare provisions 
meant that tort rules now existed within a different normative environment. Finally, the 
growing prominence of human rights discourse, including the more controversial social 
and economic rights, has had a profound impact on the normative background against 
 which tort law operates, which in various contexts has broadened the scope of 
considerations taken into account in determining tort liability.12 
There are many other factors that have led to expansion in tort liability, but I focus on 
the ones singled out here because not only do they explain the expansionary trends in tort 
liability, they also undermine the view that the resolution of a tort dispute can be 
limited only to factors that pertain only to the litigants: statistical information is inevitably 
based on a large number of events; insurance pools together many different individuals; 
deterrence seeks to use tort litigation to change the behaviour of others; the social costs of 
accidents are a public concern; human rights and the welfare state are topics that belong to 
public law and policy. When taken together it is not difficult to understand why tort law 
today is so different from what it was 150 years ago, and how misleading it is to think of it as 
a strictly ‘private’ law affair. 
As already mentioned, these trends have not been uniformly welcomed, and in recent 
years several judges and academic commentators have called for a return to a more 
‘traditional’ understanding of tort law.13 Though many of them have couched their 
arguments in terms of the nature of tort law, these authors have had to concede that it is 
possible to have a different kind of tort law from the kind they favour. Thus, despite 
appearances they have ended up defending their view by appealing to normative 
considerations such as separation of powers or the institutional capacity of courts. Quite 
often these writings have also conveyed a thinly veiled political ideology.14 The result is 
that much of tort law has begun to look ‘public’ in at least two senses: as a matter of fact, 
decisions on the scope of tort liability are affected by a myriad of factors not confined to 
the parties involved in litigation, and as a matter of normative theory, questions of the 
scope of liability are the subject of competing political theories. 
 All these developments, however, do not appear to have had much impact on the 
intentional torts dealing with harms to the person and to property.15 These torts, it seems, 
have continued to exist as relics from a very different past, a shrinking and little loved 
island of private law in constant danger of being completely submerged under the rising 
seas of the more openly public negligence law.16 Indeed, it may be that it is exactly because 
they were perceived as uniquely ‘private’ that these torts were thought incapable of 
adapting to novel situations and were therefore left behind. Because of the sorts of events 
they traditionally covered they were not subject to the kind of evolutionary pressures that led 
to the doctrinal innovations which enabled negligence to become a versatile tool for 
dealing with a wide range of new types of situation. Consequently, even issues like 
patients’ consent to medical treatment, which might have been more ‘naturally’ dealt 
with under the heading of battery, ended up being treated as cases of negligence.17 
 
 
II. THREE UNSUCCESSFUL ROLES FOR THE INTENTIONAL TORTS 
 
All of this raises the question, What role should the intentional torts play within today’s tort 
law regime? If for all practical purposes all cases of trespass can also be claimed under 
negligence, then, despite their unquestionably separate history, we would have to conclude 
that the intentional torts are now redundant and should be abandoned. Some may have 
linguistic qualms about intentional actions being treated as cases of ‘negligence’,18 but this 
should not be a matter of grave concern. If necessary, we could rename negligence as 
‘unlawful infliction of harm’ and thus resolve this problem. But before we move to do so we 
should examine whether there is no way of understanding the intentional torts that does 
 not subsume them under negligence. I will consider three possible interpretations. Common 
to all of them is the fact that they aim to locate the unique features of the intentional 
torts within the narrow ‘private’ law relationship between claimant and defendant. I 
will argue that for different reasons none of them is satisfactory. 
 
A. Intention as a Special Mental State 
According to one possible interpretation, what justifies separating the intentional torts 
from negligence is that intention is a unique mental state that cannot be equated with or 
reduced to mere prediction or indifference (let alone the lack of mental state that is often the 
mark of negligence), and therefore deserves special treatment by the law. In this sense what 
distinguishes actions done ‘with intention’ is that they involve a clear choice on the part of 
the agent.19 John Finnis, who defended the moral significance of this distinction, has 
argued that the difference is the result of the 
 
impact of choosing and intending upon the character of the chooser … [because] choices last. The 
proposal which one adopts by choice in forming an intention, together with the reasoning which 
in one’s deliberation made that proposal intelligently attractive, remains, persists, in one’s 
will … The proposal (and thus the intention) is, so to speak, synthesized into one’s will, 
 
 
one’s practical orientation and stance in the world. … Whatever consequences lie outside one’s 
proposal, because neither wanted for their own sake nor needed as a means, are not synthesized into 
one’s will.20 
Though couched in somewhat mysterious terms, Finnis’s point seems clear enough and 
 corresponds with widely shared views. The intended outcomes of one’s actions are what 
one strives for, and as such they are properly described as ‘owned by’ or ‘belonging to’ the 
agent. They are so much a part of the agent’s identity that as far as blame goes we often 
care little whether the intended outcome materialised or not. Unintended consequences, on 
the other hand, do not usually reflect on one’s personality in such a way. The difference 
between acts of intention and the outcomes of negligence is considered so fundamental that 
it is not surprising that even in jurisdictions where liability for (some types of) 
accidents is strict or absolute, there is typically an exception for the intentional infliction of 
harm. 
There is a straightforward argument that could support maintaining this distinction in 
tort law: if we accept the assumption that, other things being equal, acts done with intent 
to cause harm are more morally heinous or more dangerous (because they are more 
likely to cause harm) than those that are not, then a heightened mental element could be 
offset by lowered requirements in the physical elements of the tort. In this way we could 
capture certain undesirable behaviours that would otherwise escape tort liability. There are 
traces of this approach in the law: first, the concept of duty of care, which serves as a filtering 
mechanism for limiting liability for negligence, has no equivalent in intentional torts 
dealing with similar harm: compare the requirement for a ‘special relationship’ in 
the case of negligent misrepresentation with the lack of such a requirement in the tort of 
deceit. Second, in the case of intended outcomes there is a narrower scope for doctrines 
like novus actus interveniens, because, as the saying goes, intended consequences can 
never be too remote.21 And third, the limits on recovery for pure economic loss and pure 
mental injury are much narrower in the case of torts of intention;22 in fact, certain 
intentional torts, such as deceit or inducing breach of contract, deal almost exclusively with 
 pure economic losses,23 whereas similar actions committed without intention often do not 
give rise to tort liability at all. 
This could be a coherent and plausible basis for distinguishing between intentional 
torts and negligence. It received its clearest endorsement in English law in Letang v Cooper, 
where Lord Denning drew a distinction between negligence and trespass based on their 
mental element. As he put it, a claimant must show that he has been harmed either 
‘intentionally or negligently. If intentional, it is the tort of assault and battery. If negligent 
and causing damage, it is the tort of negligence.’24 However, as in many other instances, 
Lord Denning’s view found few supporters. Already in Letang Diplock LJ favoured the 
view that trespass is not limited to actions committed with an intention to cause harm,25 and 
subsequent cases followed his view. Perhaps it is the expansion of negligence and the decline 
of the doctrine of privity in contract that has made the need to define the intentional 
torts in this way seem less pressing. 
 
B. The Intentional Torts as Strict Liability Torts 
We can identify a second way of distinguishing between negligence and the intentional 
torts, which, perhaps paradoxically, takes a diametrically opposed approach. Contrary to the 
approach that sought to locate the distinction in a heightened mens rea requirement for the 
intentional torts, the second interpretation distinguishes the intentional torts by having a 
lower mental requirement. On this view the difference between negligence and the 
intentional torts might be characterised in the following way: while the net of 
negligence is cast very wide to cover a broad range of potential kinds of interaction 
between individuals, the scope of liability is limited by the need to show negligence on the 
 part of the injurer; by contrast, the intentional torts are considerably narrower in the 
sorts of events they cover, but require a less demanding mental element. 
A linguistic basis for such an interpretation of the intentional torts might be based on the 
distinction between acts done ‘intentionally’ and those done ‘with intent (to bring about 
a certain outcome)’. If I hit someone while driving, the actions involved in my driving 
that lead to the accident (turning the steering wheel, pressing on the accelerator) are 
intentional even though I may have no intention of harming anyone. The former is, to use 
John Searle’s terms, an example of ‘intention in action’ while the latter is a case of ‘prior 
intention’.26 
A rather strict version of this distinction may be gleaned from several seventeenth 
century cases of trespass. Two cases of trespass to land maintained that a person commits 
the tort even when his entry onto another’s land is the result of a reasonable mistake,27 but 
that a person is not liable if his entry onto another’s land was involuntary.28 Similarly, in the 
context of trespass to the person one case held that one who directly harmed another could 
not escape liability ‘except it may be adjudged utterly without his fault. As if a man by force 
take my hand and strike you …’29 Though couched in the language of fault, the example 
suggests that only lack of voluntariness would have exempted the defendant. A more recent 
case that may reflect a somewhat similar view is Wilson v Pringle, where the court said that 
it is ‘the act and not the injury which must be intentional. An intention to injure is not 
essential to an action for trespass to the person. It is the mere trespass by itself which is 
the offence.’30 On this view even an instinctive reaction may be intentional. The difficulty 
with this approach, however, is maintaining a viable distinction between trespass to the 
person and a rather broad tort of negligence (at least where physical harm is 
concerned). Ashley provides a useful illustration. Both the Court of Appeal and the 
 House of Lords had to consider the scope of self-defence where a person mistakenly 
believes he is being attacked. The courts considered three possible rules: (1) one is entitled 
to defend oneself so long as one’s actions are based on a genuine (even if unreasonable) 
belief that one is under attack; (2) the defendant is entitled to the defence so long as his 
mistaken belief is reasonable; (3) the defence is limited to cases of actual 
attack (and the defence is denied altogether in cases of mistake). 
In both courts the unanimously adopted rule was the second one,31 although some of 
the Law Lords made some obiter remarks which were sympathetic to the third rule.32 Had 
this alternative rule been adopted, trespass to the person could have been defended as a 
strict liability tort, for even in those instances in which one was in no way to blame for 
attacking someone else, one would sometimes commit battery.33 
The distinction matters in those cases in which both sides are innocent but one 
person’s actions cause harm to another. In negligence the loss in such cases remains 
uncompensated, whereas in strict liability torts the loss is shifted to the defendant. The 
rule on self-defence adopted in the Court of Appeal and left unchallenged in the House of 
Lords was that a reasonable mistake about being attacked would still excuse one in 
attacking others. This introduces into the tort those flexible elements that have made 
negligence such fertile ground for development and expansion, but this result is achieved by 
blurring the distinction between trespass and negligence. 
Despite the fact that introducing a standard of reasonableness into the tort of trespass 
creates this possibility, there was no serious attempt to justify the choice of rule. All we are 
told is that the rule is justified by the different aims of criminal law and tort law: while 
criminal law is concerned with protecting against behaviour that is ‘damaging to the good 
order of society’, tort law is concerned with ‘protecting the rights that every person is 
 entitled to assert against … others’.34 In a moment I will deal with the suggestion that tort 
law is concerned with the protection of rights, but even if one accepts this view, it is not 
clear that this calls for a different ‘balance’ in tort law and criminal law. On the one hand, 
criminal defendants already enjoy procedural protections not given to their civil 
counterparts, which may render different substantive rules undesirable. On the other 
hand, as already mentioned, by adding the reasonableness requirement to a defence of 
battery, the point of maintaining a distinct tort of trespass to the person becomes less 
clear. In other words, the decision maintains a particular balance between tort law and 
criminal law at the expense of undermining a different one within tort law. One may 
think it desirable that for the sake of maintaining a distinction between criminal law and tort 
law there should be tort liability even in some cases where there would not be 
corresponding criminal liability; it does not follow that this liability should be in battery. 
Thus, one effect of Ashley that has not received much attention is how a decision that 
seemingly sought to maintain the contemporary relevance of battery did so by eroding the 
distinction between battery and negligence. 
However, from a broader perspective that takes the whole of tort law into view, this 
result may have been entirely understandable and even justified: if the intentional torts 
had been interpreted as strict liability torts, that would have meant that when both parties are 
innocent the loss would be borne by the defendant; by contrast, in negligence in such cases 
the claimant would normally lose. Given the ubiquity of interactions that could 
potentially constitute trespass to the person (and, importantly, for which individuals 
could not adequately insure themselves), it is understandable why the courts would seek to 
narrow the scope of strict liability intentional torts. In order to achieve this end, many of 
the traditional torts (including the intentional torts) have been undergoing a process 
 which makes them increasingly similar to negligence. In the case of battery, for example, 
this was done by deciding that the tort does not cover ‘all physical conduct which is 
generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life’.35 The decision in Ashley is just 
another manifestation of the same trend. Once again, however, such trends force upon us 
the question whether there is any unique role for the intentional torts. 
In sum, while the strict liability interpretation of the intentional torts could provide a 
plausible basis for a distinction between these torts and negligence, we see that the courts go 
against it exactly because of the perception that the intentional torts are a blunt tool for 
dealing with the many kinds of interactions that are part of everyday life. The result is that 
this interpretation of the intentional torts is, like the first one, ultimately not likely to 
succeed in maintaining a significant role for these torts. 
 
C. Intentional Torts as the Foundation of Primary Rights 
Perhaps, however, considering the question as one of finding normative space for the 
intentional torts alongside negligence is the wrong approach to take. Perhaps the role the 
intentional torts play within the legal system is altogether different. Adopting an expansive 
view of the intentional torts (closer, that is, to the second interpretation considered above), 
some writers have suggested that the role of the intentional torts is to ‘vindicate’ people’s 
primary rights whose content is, roughly, that one is entitled to have control over one’s 
body and property and to be free from interference with them. This view is usually 
associated with the ‘private law’ approach to tort law.36 
Several statements in Ashley indicate that the judges believe that vindication of rights is 
one of the main purposes of tort law,37 and these statements may suggest that this is the true 
 reason for maintaining the intentional torts. In fact, however, the picture is more 
complicated than it at first appears, because the notion of vindication is ambiguous; it can be 
interpreted in several different ways, not all of which support the private law view. My 
argument in this section is that two private law interpretations of the idea of vindication are 
unconvincing, and that the best interpretation of the notion of vindication, at least as found 
in Ashley, actually fits better a ‘public law’ conception of tort law. 
The notion of vindication can be understood, first, as a ‘private’ power an individual 
has to assert the existence of her rights against other individuals (including the state). 
Alternatively, it may mean an individual’s power to make public the fact that her rights 
(whose content is determined elsewhere) have been infringed. Importantly, in the former 
sense the idea of vindication is understood as constitutive of certain relations between 
individuals; in the latter, the vindicatory (as opposed to the compensatory) role of tort law is 
in providing a public forum in which claims of infringement of rights are to be both 
examined and, where a violation has been found, protected by the state. The former 
interpretation is the one favoured by proponents of the private law view of tort law and 
will be discussed in this subsection. The alternative, public law version of vindication will be 
considered in the next section. 
The private law notion of vindication is itself ambiguous between two possible 
interpretations: abstract and concrete. Understood abstractly, tort law may be thought to 
establish such rights as freedom of speech, bodily integrity, property, autonomy and so on. 
Thus, for example, it has been suggested that ‘[t]respass vindicates the rights of property 
owners to exclude others from their land [and b]attery describes the obligation owed by 
all citizens to each other citizen not to beat, wound, or inappropriately touch another 
intentionally and unjustifiably’.38 Along those lines Donal Nolan has suggested that 
 negligence may be used to vindicate rights, such as the right to education.39 
Do we need to use tort law for this purpose? Traditionally, the common law has not 
protected primary rights by means of positive declaration,40 and so tort law has often 
been the only means to infer ‘backwards’ the existence of certain primary rights from the 
existence of legal responses to their violation. The fact that the intentional torts are per se 
torts, and thus not subject to certain limits imposed on negligence claims, has often been 
offered in support of the view that one of their roles is to constitute primary rights. Even 
though the prospects of people bringing claims for violations of their primary rights 
when they have not suffered harm are small, these torts serve as the legal placeholders for the 
existence of those rights. They are ‘placeholders’ because the rights established 
through them (say, private property or freedom of speech in the abstract) are separate 
from the question of their protection in individual cases. 
In this sense, English tort law has arguably not been a success story.41 A lack of (if 
nothing else) the rhetorical force of a positive declaration of rights may be part of the 
reason why English law is a relative latecomer in respect of many issues on which other 
legal systems (including other common law systems) have gone much further. To be sure, 
opinions may differ on the matter, and no doubt looking only at the law provides only a 
partial explanation of what must be in part a product of the British political tradition. Be all 
that as it may, reliance on the intentional torts, or for that matter on tort law more 
generally, no longer seems necessary for the sake of vindication of rights in the abstract 
sense, because the existence of these rights is by now well established in English law from 
other sources. In fact, often these rights are so well established that it is doubtful whether 
anyone asked to provide proof of their legal recognition would turn to the intentional 
torts as evidence. Probably first among those are societal attitudes toward such matters, 
 which, though vague, seem rather firm with regard to many of those rights the intentional 
torts are supposed to vindicate at the abstract level. Such societal attitudes are known to 
have an impact on the political underpinning or, if you will, the ideology of a legal 
system,42 and it is doubtful whether without such support legal recognition of these rights 
would remain intact. 
Even within the narrower bounds of more traditional legal materials there are ample 
sources for the vindication of rights in the abstract sense, first among them criminal law. 
True, criminal law gives individuals only a limited role in the proceedings and therefore 
only a limited power to demand the vindication of their rights, but this does not affect the 
abstract sense of vindication we are concerned with at the moment. So long as the 
criminal law system functions reasonably well, individuals can point to, say, the many 
crimes concerned with the protection of private property, bodily integrity, security and so 
on as constitutive of their rights. Furthermore, as already pointed out, since very few 
people would (and could afford to) sue in tort law just for the sake of vindication of their 
rights, the practical difference between criminal law and tort law in this respect is rather 
minor. So long as it is the symbolic vindication of abstract rights that we care about, then 
criminal prohibitions seem just as capable of providing it, in some sense perhaps even 
better than tort law. The developed distinction within criminal law between justifications and 
excuses implies that in the case of a successful excuse the defendant will be exonerated from 
criminal responsibility even though the legal system could still acknowledge that another 
person’s rights have been infringed. Thus, to use Ashley as an example, there is no problem 
in saying that Ashley’s rights have been infringed by PC Sherwood’s actions, even if the 
latter’s actions are found to be excusable. Tort law, which lacks this distinction, fares worse 
in this regard. 
 An additional source for the vindication of rights available since 2000 is the Human 
Rights Act 1998. Together with the European Convention on Human Rights it provides an 
additional source of positive declarations about many of the very rights the intentional torts 
may be supposed to vindicate (as well as some rights whose recognition in English tort law 
has been patchy at best).43 
It might be countered that criminal law or the Convention cannot fulfil the role of tort 
law, because they deal in the relations between individuals and the state, and not with the 
rights and duties individuals have towards each other. But this is a mistake, which stems 
from confusing the abstract and concrete senses of the idea of vindication of rights: in the 
abstract sense it is rights like bodily integrity or freedom of speech that we seek to 
vindicate. And in this sense criminal law and human rights declarations are sufficient. 
Even if we think that murder or rape are public wrongs, when we consider what makes 
them public wrongs, part of the answer is that they violate individuals’ rights. In the 
context of the Convention there is by now a familiar body of law which establishes that 
states’ obligation to ‘protect’ human rights imposes on the state positive obligations to 
prevent violations of individuals’ rights by third parties. These obligations make sense 
only if the Convention is a source of legal rights and duties of individuals against each 
other.44 
Here is another way of making this point: suppose tort law were to be abolished 
completely and replaced by an extensive social insurance mechanism while leaving the rest of 
the law intact. Would we say that our right to bodily integrity has been abolished? In the 
abstract sense the answer is ‘obviously not’. In fact, such a change in the law may be 
justified by showing that the new legal regime would better protect individuals’ rights. 
Whether or not this is true is an empirical question, not a conceptual one. 
 If, despite all this, we believe that for whatever reason tort law is needed for the 
vindication of rights in this abstract sense, then negligence could provide as good a source 
within tort law for this purpose. Indeed, it is exactly the flexibility of negligence that allows it 
to be expanded to cover all sorts of rights (such as the right to education that Nolan had in 
mind) that would be very difficult to recognise through the intentional torts. Some have 
suggested, however, that it is only the intentional torts that vindicate rights like bodily 
integrity or autonomy, and they can do so exactly because the claimant does not need to 
show harm or unreasonableness on behalf of the defendant. This, it is further argued, 
shows just how important those rights are.45 Even here, however, the flexibility of 
negligence enables courts to take into account the bodily integrity and autonomy of 
individuals not only as potential victims, but also as potential injurers. Individuals’ 
autonomy might be undermined not just by physical intrusion by other individuals, but 
also by overbroad legal limitations on their actions. Vindication of physical integrity 
through a broad tort of trespass to the person could undermine people’s autonomy if 
innocuous trifles that cause no harm could constitute a tort. As we have seen, such 
consequences were avoided by incorporating elements of reasonableness into the 
intentional torts. 
So, in the abstract sense, the idea that tort law, or more specifically the intentional 
torts, are required for the vindication of the existence of rights is unnecessary. Perhaps, 
however, the rights vindicated should be understood differently, ie as establishing the 
boundaries between activities that lead to tort liability and those that do not. In some 
writings by defenders of the private law model of tort law we see the view that it is not 
(just) broad and abstract rights like freedom of speech or bodily integrity that tort law is 
concerned with. Rather, the rights in question take the form of the right not to suffer 
 psychiatric harm by means of negligently causing harm to oneself, or the right not to 
suffer psychiatric harm by witnessing the immediate aftermath of physical harm suffered by 
one’s spouse as a result of another’s negligence.46 At least in some of the instances in which 
the courts have spoken of vindication of rights, it appears that it is this sense they had in 
mind.47 
On this view, my arguments so far have been wide of the mark, because they 
misunderstand the role of tort law in vindicating rights. Tort law is required in this sense in 
order to make concrete the boundaries of abstract rights, something that declaratory 
documents cannot do precisely because of their generality. On this view there is no space 
between the existence of a right in a concrete situation and its vindication by tort law, 
and so at no point in the process does tort law vindicate any rights whose existence is 
determined elsewhere.48 Put differently, in the abstract sense the relationship between 
tort law and vindication is justificatory; the existence of a right (not itself ‘established’ by 
tort law) gives reason to vindicate it through tort law. In the concrete sense, the relation is 
conceptual. Whenever tort liability is imposed, this means that a right has been violated; 
whenever tort liability is not imposed, this means that a right has not been violated. 
The main difficulty with vindication in the concrete sense is that to say that tort law 
vindicates rights is to state a tautology.49 In this sense the view that tort law vindicates 
rights is thus trivially true, but in this sense it cannot carve out any distinct conception of 
tort law. All accounts of tort law, including those thought to be opposed to the private 
conception of tort law (such as economic interpretations of tort law), are consistent with it. 
Any liability whatsoever can be phrased as liability for a violated right. For example, by 
itself this view is consistent with the view that we have a right not to suffer loss at the 
hands of another, a right not to suffer loss when the costs of eliminating it are lower than 
 the expected loss itself, a right not be humiliated in public, or a right to be rescued by 
others when in danger. This is because in the concrete sense the notion of vindication is by 
definition devoid of any justificatory force. 
 
 
III. A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE INTENTIONAL TORTS 
 
Had we only considered the idea of vindication of rights in these senses, we would have 
had good reason to doubt the point of retaining the intentional tort of trespass to the 
person, and a fortiori the outcome of Ashley.50 This would not necessarily have meant 
that an injurer’s state of mind had no role to play in tort law. We could still maintain the 
normative significance of the distinction between intentional and careless acts, and proof of 
intention could still play a role, for example, in the determination of damages (an 
approach largely unrecognised in English tort law, but more common in other 
jurisdictions). This, however, would hardly provide a reason for retaining separate intentional 
torts. First, under no account do the cases that justify punitive damages track accurately the 
distinction between intentional torts and negligence: there are many instances of 
intentional torts which would not call for such damages; and there may be—at least on 
some justifications of punitive damages—good reasons to award them in some cases of 
negligence.51 Second, even if we thought that proof of intention were a relevant factor in 
deciding whether to award punitive damages, this would not require separating 
intentional torts from negligence. Proof of intention to cause harm could then be treated as 
an aggravating factor, relevant, necessary or sufficient (as the case may be), within other torts. 
Is there nonetheless a way of understanding what was decided in Ashley? I think there is, 
 but it calls for a different interpretation of the decision in both the Court of Appeal and the 
House of Lords, one based on some elements in those judgments that have been 
neglected in previous commentary on the case. On this view one of the points of 
contention in the case, and one that cuts across the majority-dissent lines in both courts, 
deals with the potential public role of tort law and of the intentional torts in particular. 
This view is consistent with something like the idea of vindication of rights appearing in the 
decision, although only if understood differently from the more familiar ‘private law’ 
interpretation. In this sense vindication of a right is not synonymous with recognition of 
certain legal relations between individuals. Rather, vindication is understood as a 
particular aim of tort law (or perhaps more specifically tort litigation), and it is to provide a 
public and impartial public forum for declaring that a claimant’s rights (whose legal 
origin must be established on other grounds) have been infringed.52 
Understood in this way, vindication may not seem at first particularly novel or 
exciting. Arguably, this has been the role of courts from their earliest days. Vindication 
through tort law in this sense is public in that it requires the existence of a public body 
funded by the state for its existence, but that seems true of all tort cases. Moreover, since it 
is legal rights we are concerned with, this view is, once again, consistent with any 
substantive theory of what the content of those rights should be. 
In this sense, then, the public sense of vindication seems not much more illuminating 
than the private one. Even in this sense, I think it tells us something important, namely 
that the idea of ‘private law’ is in some sense incoherent so long as state institutions (be 
they the legislature or the courts) are involved in both the promulgation of rights and 
their protection. However, it would be a mistake—indeed, a very similar mistake to the 
one committed by proponents of the private law view—to think that something follows 
 from it regarding what the content of tort law should be. 
If that is the case, we are again faced with a puzzle: the courts in Ashley did let the 
claim in trespass to the person proceed to trial, and they relied on the notion of 
vindication in reaching this conclusion. What did they mean by that? I want to suggest that 
at least some of the judges involved in this case used the language of ‘vindication’ in a 
distinct sense, quite different from its interpretations considered so far. For them the 
decision to allow the claim in trespass to the person to proceed to trial was based on their 
wish that potential misconduct by public authorities be investigated and pronounced 
upon in a public forum. Thus, in this sense the vindication in question was ‘public’ not 
merely in the sense that all law is in some sense public, but in the sense that they were 
willing to take into account the concerns of the general public not involved in the case in 
the context of tort litigation. Vindication of rights by tort law is thus not the affirmation of 
abstract rights or the determination of the boundaries of tort liability. Rather, 
‘vindication’ consists in a finding that a particular individual’s rights have been violated 
and the recognition that on certain occasions such a finding is of general public 
significance. If this is correct, what is significant about Ashley is the willingness of the 
courts to use the machinery of a ‘private’ law trial for the sake of examining a matter of 
public concern. 
Perhaps the clearest statement of this view is found in Arden LJ’s judgment in the 
Court of Appeal: 
 
The public has high expectations of the police. Like everyone else, the police are subject to the 
rule of law. Those suspected of criminal activity are entitled to the protection of the law. What the 
claimants seek in these proceedings is an explanation and redress in a court of law in respect of the 
 fatal wounding of James Ashley and its subsequent disclosure to the public.53 
 
In this passage Arden LJ focuses on the public interest in knowing what brought about 
Ashley’s death and the importance of guaranteeing that the police comply with the rule of 
law. There are indications that this is what troubled some of the other judges hearing the 
case as well. First, the police admitted negligence in this case all too quickly. After all, if the 
facts had been as assumed by the court, the police should have stood a good chance of 
answering a claim not just in trespass, but in negligence as well. If PC Sherwood’s 
mistake was reasonable in the circumstances, then it is at least arguable that he was not 
negligent and that the claim should have been dismissed altogether. Exactly the same 
considerations that the judges rely on to conclude that there was no trespass to the person in 
this case (in particular the fact that the decision was made in the spur of the moment and in 
highly pressing circumstances) can be found in negligence decisions explaining why the 
defendant did not breach his duty of care.54 Why then were the police so quick to admit 
their negligence in this case? One possibility suggested by the quote above is that the judges 
suspected that the facts were not exactly as the police claimed them to be. In the Court of 
Appeal Clarke MR mentioned forensic evidence and some conflicting accounts given 
by other people at the scene which suggested that the police’s version of the events was 
inaccurate;55 he also mentioned evidence regarding Sherwood’s problematic 
disciplinary record, which at one point even led to a temporary suspension of his firearms 
authorisation.56 
Alternatively, the negligence was not at the point of execution but rather at the 
planning stage,57 but even in that case it may be in the public interest to know whether 
there were additional violations of police regulations by PC Sherwood. Either way, it 
 appears that an important reason for the courts’ decision to allow the trespass claim to go 
to trial was the need to make the police more accountable to the public for their 
actions. Sensing that the inquiries into the events that led to Ashley’s death had not been 
properly conducted but unable to order a public inquiry, some of the judges in both the 
House of Lords and the Court of Appeal adopted the closest possible alternative to it: 
they allowed the claim in trespass to go to trial and hinted that they would want to see a 
more vigorous investigation into what actually happened the night Ashley died.58 Thus, this 
approach is consistent with the vague idea of vindication of rights, and yet (and 
seemingly paradoxically) it seems to undermine the particular view of tort law usually 
associated with it. In this sense vindication is quite limited, because the number of cases in 
which it would be invoked is rather small (in contrast with the private law versions of the 
vindication argument, in which each tort case, implicitly at least, vindicates rights), but in 
those cases vindication is of real, practical significance. 
This conclusion is important in several respects. Most narrowly, for the sake of 
understanding the outcome of the case it is worth noting that the different views on this 
matter were not drawn along the majority-dissent lines. In the Court of Appeal it looks as 
though the individualistic, private law view prevailed: it was endorsed both by Clarke MR 
writing for the majority59 and by Auld LJ, who explicitly stated that ‘[t]he claim in battery 
is a private law claim, the only proper function of which is to provide a private law 
remedy’.60 In the House of Lords, however, the public law view suggested here seems to 
have had the support of at least two (and perhaps three) members of the panel, with the 
views of another (Lord Bingham) not entirely clear on the matter.61 (Only Lord Carswell 
clearly rejected this view.62) Lord Scott seemed to approve of the claimants’ desire ‘to 
obtain a public admission or finding that the deceased … was unlawfully killed by PC 
 Sherwood. They want a finding of liability on their assault and battery claim in order to 
obtain public vindication of the deceased’s right not to have been subjected to a deadly 
assault …’63 Lord Rodger approved of claimants pursuing tort law claims to the end in 
order to ‘try out another novel, and more doubtful cause of action, … [or] in order to try to 
establish a point of law which would help others in a similar plight’.64 And interestingly, the 
clearest support for this view in the House of Lords can be found in Lord Neuberger’s 
dissent, in which he stated: ‘I accept … that there is a point in seeking a declaration … 
because it is reasonable for Mr Ashley’s estate to wish to establish that his death was 
unlawfully caused and because there is a public interest element in proceeding.’65 
But more than head counting, if this reading of the decisions is correct, then it may 
be that the most important aspect of Ashley is not any of the technical issues that took up 
most of its pages. The question of mistaken self-defence and the burden of proof in such 
cases are matters of relatively little practical significance because they arise very rarely (as 
evidenced by the paucity of cases dealing with these issues). Rather, Ashley is important 
because it shows the willingness of at least some of the judges in the Court of Appeal and 
the House of Lords to consciously introduce public considerations into tort law. To put 
matters more controversially, some of the judges may have used expressions like 
‘vindication of rights’ which are associated with a private law conception of tort law to 
reach a ‘public law’ result that broadened judicial inspection of government action. 
The significance of the decision lies in its particular understanding of the idea of 
oversight. Using tort law as a tool for guaranteeing governmental accountability is a 
relatively novel, but by now not unheard of, idea.66 In this way tort law may perhaps 
already be given a role that goes beyond its traditional scope, but it is one that can be 
accommodated within the Diceyan conception of the rule of law. What is important about 
 the approach of Arden LJ, Lord Rodger and Lord Neuberger is their willingness to 
consider the interests of the general public, that is, people who were not directly harmed in 
the incident and who are not represented in the litigation in the context of a tort claim. This 
willingness on the part of some of the judges to blur the boundaries between private and 
public law and to give the intentional torts a more public role may also help in 
understanding the recent resurgence of the ‘newly evolving tort’67 of misfeasance in 
public office, also considered in Ashley. Originally concerned with voting rights, 
misfeasance in public office is an intentional tort exclusively concerned with harms 
resulting from abuses of power by public authorities. This tort lay dormant and little used for 
many decades,68 and its new lease of life may reflect an understanding of a greater need 
for stronger legal means of controlling government action, and a growing awareness 
on the part of the judges of the potential for using tort law for this purpose.69 
Looking to the future, Ashley raises three questions:70 the first is whether it will be 
necessary to rely on the intentional torts for this public role in the future. Could courts in 
future cases not add this role to the versatile and flexible tort of negligence? Is there 
anything that gives the intentional torts any advantage over negligence in this context? 
Admittedly, the reading of Ashley suggested here is consistent with a broader public law 
role for all of tort law, and so if future courts decide to adopt a similar approach, they 
might not confine it only to the intentional torts. It may be that even in Ashley the public 
role given to battery was merely a pragmatic solution to the unique facts of the case. 
Perhaps it was battery and not negligence on which the ‘burden’ of public inquiry had 
been laid only because of the unusual way in which both parties decided to plead their 
case. 
Even if that is the case, however, the decisions in Ashley are not insignificant: the 
 police clearly knew that they could end the matter and avoid judicial inquiry into the 
events that led to Ashley’s death by admitting that their actions amounted to battery, and yet 
they chose not to do so. In this regard the significant point is not whether other torts could 
have been (and in the future, might be) used for the same purpose. The point is that the court 
was willing to use tort law, and specifically the intentional torts, for public purposes. 
The second, related, question is how likely it is that the intentional torts would be 
used for a similar purpose in the future. In part the answer to this question depends on the 
behaviour of defendant public authorities in future cases. Having learnt their lesson, they 
might prefer to swallow their pride and admit to battery if only to avoid a potentially more 
damaging public inquiry in court. On the other hand, it may be that the otherwise 
unimportant linguistic point about the difference between negligence and intention 
would prove significant in this context, as public authorities might prefer to have a long 
inquiry which they might survive relatively intact to a damaging admission of the 
‘intentional’ violation of an individual’s rights. 
Apart from public authorities’ reaction to Ashley, it remains to be seen how many 
future courts will be willing to look behind the questions that appear on the surface of 
Ashley and read it in the way suggested here. Indeed, it may be that the matter was 
discussed in such vague terms exactly in order to guarantee that the decision in Ashley 
remains ‘a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only’.71 Moreover, even if 
some of the judges do wish to expand this approach to courts’ inspection of 
governmental bodies, it may be that Arden LJ’s discussion at the end of her judgment on the 
effect of European law on future cases72 indicates that there will not be much need in the 
future for the particular technique chosen in Ashley to guarantee oversight of government 
action, as it may be easier and more natural for the courts to rely on the European 
 Convention on Human Rights for this purpose.73 On the other hand, it may be that some 
judges, who may be reticent about the importation of European ideas into English law,74 
will find this home-grown development more appealing. In any case, here too, the issue is 
not so much whether future courts will follow Ashley as precedent. What matters more is 
what this case reveals about the attitude of some of the judges regarding the foundations of 
tort law, judges whose view is clearly different from what we are told by many 
commentators is the correct way of understanding (English) tort law. Only a few years 
before Ashley was decided, the House of Lords, relying on European jurisprudence, 
emphasised the importance of conducting a public investigation into the unlawful death of 
a prisoner at the hands of another prisoner in the context of a judicial review, ‘public’ law 
case.75 In Ashley, ignoring the public-private divide, it allowed the use of English tort law for 
the same purpose. The decision thus both emphasises within tort law the deterrent role of 
tort law over its more private, compensatory role; but it can also be seen as part of a 
broader attempt by the judiciary to strengthen constitutional values such as governmental 
transparency and accountability, rule of law, and checks and balances. Since some have 
questioned the capacity of monetary remedies to have an effect on government,76 the 
approach adopted in Ashley may prove particularly fruitful. 
The third question is whether the broader development which I have argued is 
reflected in Ashley is desirable and whether it is likely to be effective. Here the traditional 
divisions of law may lead some to the conclusion that such inspections of governmental 
behaviour should not be conducted as part of a tort case, because the purpose of tort law is 
only to deal with the compensation claims of private individuals as a result of individual 
wrongdoing.77 Put this way, this objection strikes me as very weak. The scope and aims of 
tort law do not come to us from heaven as commandments to obey, and whatever roles tort 
 law currently fulfils should be maintained only to the extent that they serve a purpose. There 
may be very good reason to distinguish between the private and the public: after all, most 
people behave differently in private and in public and it is entirely plausible that the law 
should reflect this distinction in some way. But as the boundaries between private and public 
life have shifted in the last few decades (due to, among other things, the rise of the welfare 
state as well as technological changes), it is only natural that the boundaries between private 
and public law will shift as well. If what has traditionally been classified as public law proves 
insufficient for inspecting public bodies, courts should not let formal boundaries stand in the 
way.78 
However, the objection may be put more forcefully. It may be argued that because 
historically tort law was conceived as concerned only with private disputes, its substantive 
rules, as well as the procedural rules of civil proceedings, have developed in such a way that 
tort law cannot adequately fulfil this new role assigned to it: the judge might not have the 
experience or expertise necessary to deal with such questions, adversarial proceedings 
might be thought inferior to a more inquisitorial process needed to deal with such 
questions, the judge and parties will be operating under certain time or financial 
constraints that will hamper careful examination of the relevant issues, the concerns of 
certain relevant parties may not be adequately represented, and so on. This is potentially a 
formidable challenge, and it is certainly possible that on certain occasions the objection 
could prove decisive against using tort law for the purposes envisaged here. I do not think, 
however, that it calls for an outright rejection of the approach presented in this essay. 
First, there is a long if convoluted history of dealing with public law matters in what are 
formally private law disputes, so there is no a priori reason to think that judges are 
incapable of dealing with such matters in the context of private law disputes; second, 
 procedural and evidentiary rules of civil proceedings have undergone considerable change in 
recent years, making claims about the impossibility of adequately handling such claims 
within the confines of a private law dispute seem less persuasive. The more active role 
given to judges with the advent of case management gives them a greater ability to turn 
the parties to the issues and evidence they consider important for the resolution of the 
case.79 Finally, while considerations based on the path-dependent development of the law 
have their force, they cannot forever block a change in course, if one is needed. If one 
believes that these rules stand in the way of an otherwise valuable goal, they should be 
changed. 
At the same time, it is clear that the solution found in this case is a makeshift tool, and as 
such it has its limitations. Not all cases can be brought within the remit of intentional torts, 
and as we have seen, ultimately the decision as to whether a judicial inquiry will be 
conducted is in the hands of the defendant. If the police had admitted to battery in 
Ashley’s case, there would have been no trial, and thus no opportunity for judicial 
investigation. Anyone concerned about the adequacy of existing mechanisms for 
inspecting public authorities (and police activity in particular) would surely prefer to see a 
more comprehensive and direct treatment of this problem. 
This leads to another, related, challenge, namely that there is no reason to think that 
such judgments are going to be an effective means of inspecting governmental action. 
There is a familiar view, with considerable academic support in the UK, that questions the 
wisdom of relying on courts to provide an effective check on the excesses of the 
executive.80 Those holding this view would surely doubt that the occasional tort claim 
could have any noticeable impact on the behaviour of the executive. They may be right; 
but perhaps, especially when the powers of the executive are constantly expanding while the 
 capacity of the legislature to adequately control it is in decline,81 and when because of the 
sheer size and complexity of their operations effective control of public authorities is 
increasingly difficult, what is required is a willingness to consider new means of 






Looked at from a narrow perspective, Ashley is an unusual case. Judges ordinarily try to 
avoid deciding on matters that have no effect on the outcome of the case. Their reasons for 
doing so are easy to understand and for the most part entirely justified. There is no point 
spending time and effort on deciding ‘academic’ questions when time and money are 
limited and there are so many other cases awaiting resolution. The case is also 
interesting because it goes against recent trends that have tended to be quite restrictive 
with regard to tort liability of public authorities. (Even though most of these decisions 
involved liability for negligence, many of the policy considerations relied upon against the 
imposition of liability are applicable to other torts as well.) Why, then, did the majorities in 
the Court of Appeal and House of Lords agree to let the question of whether James 
Ashley’s person had been trespassed go to trial? 
This puzzle calls for explanation. In this article I have considered several 
‘individualistic’ readings of the intentional torts. Some, like the view that the intentional 
torts should be limited to acts done with intention, focus mostly on individual injurers; 
others, like the view that the intentional torts should be concerned with vindication of 
 rights (in its traditional understanding), focus on individual victims. I have argued that 
if we try to limit the ruling in Ashley to these interpretations, then the decisions of both 
the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords are difficult to defend. 
Instead I suggested that we should look beyond the parties involved in the case; then a 
different picture emerges. On this picture the tort of trespass to the person was allowed to go 
to trial for the sake of making public authorities accountable for their actions. Lord Mustill 
once indicated that in order to ‘avoid a vacuum in which the citizen would be left without 
protection against a misuse of executive powers the courts have had no option but to 
occupy the dead ground in a manner, and in areas of public life, which could not have been 
foreseen 30 years ago’.82 If my analysis is correct, Ashley is most convincing as reflecting a 
similar attitude. Over the years English courts have often been accused of tending to be 
overly deferential and uncritical towards public authorities and particularly the police,83 and 
recent examples show that this attitude may not simply be a thing of the past.84 This attitude 
might have been justified had public trust in the police been high, but revelations of police 
impropriety that was later covered up led one newspaper to report that ‘[t]he incident 
undermines confidence in the accountability at the police department’.85 Rather than 
concerns over an excessively defensive police force as a result of the imposition of liability, 
such incidents indicate that there are reasons to be concerned about an overly aggressive 
police force, and that part of the problem may be insufficient judicial oversight.86 Some of 
the opinions in the Ashley decisions reflect a recognition of these problems and a 
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